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Abstract 
When software safety requirements are imposed 
on legacy safety-critical systems, retrospective safety 
cases need to be formulated as part of recertifying the 
systems for further use and risks must be documented 
and managed to give confidence for reusing the 
systems. The SEJ Software Development Risk 
Taxonomy [4] focuses on general software 
development issues. It does not, however, cover all the 
safety risks. The Software Safety Risk Taxonomy [8] 
was developed which provides a construct for eliciting 
and categorizing software safety risks in a 
straightforward manner. In this paper, we present 
extended work on the taxonomy for safety that 
incorporates the additional issues inherent in the 
development and maintenance of safety-critical 
systems with software. An instrument called a 
Software Safety Risk Taxonomy Based Questionnaire 
(TBQ) is generated containing questions addressing 
each safety attribute in the Software Safety Risk 
Taxonomy. Software safety risks are surfaced using 
the new TBQ and then analyzed. In this paper we give 
the definitions for the specialized Product Engineering 
Class within the Software Safety Risk Taxonomy. At 
the end of the paper, we present the tool known as the 
'Legacy Systems Risk Database Tool' that is used to 
collect and analyze the data required to show 
traceability to a particular safety standard 
1. Introduction 
Governmental agencies and industry often require 
the use of safety standards in contracted projects to 
ensure that the systems produced are completed in an 
ordered manner. The combination of design, analysis, 
inspection, and test activities, when consistently
performed throughout the system development 
lifecycle, has shown to be extremely successful, as in 
the International Space Station flight computer system. 
In general, safety standards and requirements are 
required to be in place at the beginning of a program 
or project, but this is not always the case. The NASA 
Software Safety Standard is one such standard that 
contains process-oriented software safety requirements 
that are to be met by all NASA developed or 
contracted safety-critical software, regardless of its 
age. The standard states that each NASA legacy 
system should be assessed for the software's 
contribution to the safety of the system, and then 
planning should commence for the individual legacy 
system to meet or not meet the requirements of the 
standard. The NASA 'software safety litmus test' is 
used for the assessment of the software in the system 
for safety criticality. A common approach to aid in the 
determination of whether or not a safety-critical 
system meets software safety requirements was not 
specified in the NASA software safety standard. For 
this reason the Software Safety Risk Taxonomy was 
proposed as a framework to assess risk in legacy 
safety-critical computer systems when attempting to 
apply the software safety standard after the fact. 
Gauging software safety risk [8] is an essential 
part of determining the specific activities and depth of 
analyses needed to meet software safety requirements. 
The implementation and approach to meeting software 
safety requirements will vary to reflect the system to 
which they are applied. [1] 
Performance of safety standards is part of what is 
called making a 'safety case'. A safety case is the 
documented demonstration that the system complies 
with the specified safety requirements. [2] To provide 
safety assurance, evidence needs to be gathered on the 
integrity of the system and put forward as an argued
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case, e.g., the safety case, that the system is adequately 
safe. [2] A safety case is not a new concept, however 
making a formal safety case has not been required for 
NASA's legacy safety-critical systems. The usefulness 
of safety and dependability cases is being investigated 
for some new development projects within NASA for 
certifying systems as safe and secure. The authors 
believe that it is equally important to make safety 
cases for legacy systems that may be reused in support 
of new major programs and projects. 
Problems occur when attempting to fulfill the 
requirements of a software safety standard in a legacy 
real-time safety-critical computer system. In the past, 
researchers have investigated the problem of 
retrospectively making a safety case for the software, 
to meet new safety standards in the industry. [3] The 
risk of not meeting certain software safety 
requirements is a topic that needs to be addressed 
when attempting to make safety cases for legacy 
safety-critical computer systems. This is also a reason 
for devising a new taxonomy specifically designed to 
facilitate the identification of software safety risks. 
This paper presents the definitions for the Product 
Engineering Class and the corresponding safety 
elements and attributes that belong to the Software 
Safety Risk Taxonomy. The taxonomy was proposed 
in a earlier paper [8] and is based on the Software 
Development Risk Taxonomy created and used by the 
Software Engineering Institute (SEI) [4, 5, 6], with an 
additional Legacy element added to the Product 
Engineering class, as in the Risk Taxonomy authored 
by Batista Webster et al. [7] The SEI taxonomy was 
originally chosen as the model for the Software Safety 
Risk Taxonomy because it maps very well to the 
structure of the NASA Software Safety Standard. The 
NASA-STD-8719.13B addresses not only new 
software development, but also legacy, heritage and 
reused safety-critical software systems. 
A Software Risk Evaluation (SRE) is a practice 
that was developed by the SEI containing a formal 
method for identifying, analyzing, communicating and 
mitigating software technical risk. [5] The SEI 
Software Development Risk Taxonomy is a part of 
this practice. In our research we are using the Software 
Safety Risk Taxonomy in addition to the SEI 
Taxonomy to generate a comprehensive list of 
questions for defining an inclusive set of risks for 
legacy safety-critical computer systems. The Software 
Safety Risk Taxonomy addresses the additional safety 
related tasks and analyses that are required over and 
above traditional software engineering process 
activities. 
A pilot study using the SEI taxonomy and the 
original Taxonomy Based Questionnaire (TBQ) was 
initiated using one of the NASA legacy systems at the
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in Florida. This system 
monitors and controls ground support equipment at the 
launch site, facility power and the sound suppression 
water system. Preliminary data was collected and risks 
were captured. The next step in the pilot is to use the 
new Software Safety Risk Taxonomy and its 
corresponding TBQ. The Software Safety Risk TBQ 
will be used to interview participants in a similar 
fashion to elicit the software safety risks. Results 
obtained from the interview process will be used when 
following the rest of the SRE practice. Once the pilot 
study is complete, the forward plan is to work with 4-6 
other legacy systems at both KSC and Wallops Flight 
Facility in Virginia. 
2. Problems with Developing Retrospective 
Safety Cases 
It can be assumed that not all safety requirements 
in a safety standard can be met for a legacy system and 
therefore a software safety risk assessment must be 
performed. The assumption that an existing system is 
safe may not hold when the legacy system is used in a 
new application. 
There are three basic problems with developing 
retrospective safety cases. The first is reliance on the 
safe use of the system over the years, and the objective 
evidence of the safety issues. Safety issues include 
reporting and analysis of accidents, incidents and 
resultant problem reports. The second problem is with 
attempting to show that the design of the legacy 
system is acceptable in the present, even though it was 
developed to standards current at the time. In addition 
to this, the legacy system may not have been designed 
to any standard at all, and this will also be a 
consideration when creating a safety case. The third 
problem is that of missing information. Information is 
lost over time; vendors go out of business or are no 
longer under contract with the maintainer of the 
system. [9] 
With legacy systems, it can be a difficult task to 
construct a safety case, because there may be few to 
no artifacts available to show compliance with the 
software safety requirements. Because of this, there 
will be risks associated with not meeting safety 
requirements in a legacy safety-critical system. These 
software safety risks must be addressed by project 
management to give confidence for reusing an existing 
system. Risk factors in general will be different for 
legacy safety-critical computer systems, and the 
software within them. Knowing the risks, project 
managers can then decide whether to try to recreate 
missing artifacts or accept the risks of not having 
certain safety documents or analyses to make the 
safety case. This is another reason for a taxonomy
specifically focused on identifying software safety risk 
factors. 
3. The Software Safety Risk Taxonomy 
The Software Safety Risk Taxonomy, like the SEI 
taxonomy, maps the characteristics of safety-critical 
software development, and therefore of safety-critical 
software development risks. [4] The Software Safety 
Risk TBQ consists of questions only related to those 
additional safety activities essential to producing and 
maintaining safety-critical software. Figures 1, 2 and 
3 illustrate the three classes and their elements and 
attributes of the safety taxonomy. [8] 
A. Product Engineering 
1. Safety Requirements 
Identifiable 
Stability 
Completeness 
Clarity 
Validity 
Feasibility 
Safety requirements traceability 
Safety requirements analysis 
2. Safety Design 
Safety Functionality 
Difficulty 
Safety Interfaces 
Safety Performance 
SafetyTestability 
Hardware Constraints 
Non-Developmental Software 
Safety design traceability 
Safety design analysis 
3. Safety Code and Unit Test 
Feasibility 
SafetyTesting 
Coding/Implementation 
Safety code traceability 
Safety code analysis 
4. Safety Integration and Test 
Safety Environment 
Product Integration 
Safety test traceability 
Safety test analysis 
5. Engineering Specialties 
Safety Maintainability 
Reliability 
Security 
Human Factors 
Specifications 
6. Legacy 
Reverse engineering 
Replacement 
Figure 1. Product engineering class
The Product Engineering class in Figure 1 is the 
largest class in the Software Safety Risk Taxonomy so 
we will address it in this paper. It contains the 
elements numbered I through 6 that cover the 
development of the safety-critical system products. 
Under each element are the attributes of interest for 
eliciting safety risks. 
B. Development Environment 
7. Safety Management Process 
Safety Planning 
Safety Organization 
Safety Management Experience 
Safety Program Interfaces 
8. Safety Management Methods 
Safety Monitoring 
Safety Personnel 
Safety Assurance 
Safety Configuration Management 
9. Work Environment 
SafetyAttitude 
Cooperation 
Communication 
Morale 
Figure 2. Development environment class 
The Development Environment class in Figure 2 
covers the project environment and the process used to 
engineer safety-critical system products. [8] It contains 
the elements numbered 7 through 9 in the taxonomy. 
C. Program Constraints 
10. Safety Resources 
SafetySchedule 
Safety Staff 
Safety Budget 
Safety Facilities 
Figure 3. Program constraints class 
The Program Constraints class in Figure 3 
contains the factors that may be outside of the control 
of the project responsible for the safety-critical system 
development. [8] Its sole element is numbered 10 in 
the taxonomy. 
In section 4 we provide the descriptions of the 
Product Engineering taxonomic class, elements and 
attributes which are specialized for safety. In section 5 
are some sample questions. The 'Legacy Systems Risk 
Database Tool' that is being developed as part of this 
research project, is briefly described in section 6.
4. Software Safety Risk Taxonomy 
Product Engineering Class 
Product engineering is defined as the technical 
processes to define, design and construct or assemble a 
product. [11] Product engineering for safety is defined 
as the technical processes used to build a safety-
critical product. It refers to the system engineering and 
software engineering activities involved in creating a 
safety-critical system that satisfies specified safety 
requirements and customer expectations. [4] Activities 
include system hazard analysis, system and software 
safety requirements analysis and specification, system 
and software safety design and implementation, 
integration of hardware and software components, and 
software and system test for safety-critical systems. 
The elements of this class cover the safety 
engineering activities that are necessary to be 
performed over and above traditional system and 
software engineering activities. 
In the Product Engineering class the software 
safety risks that will most likely be generated will 
relate to inadequate analysis of the system for the 
technical software safety requirements. Additionally, 
software safety risks can also be linked to insufficient 
safety design features. Coding standards that do not 
include safety considerations might also contribute to 
software safety risks. [8] 
Software Safety Risk Taxonomy 
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Figure 4. Software safety risk taxonomy 
Figure 4 shows the high level schematic of the 
software safety taxonomy, and the relationships 
between the Product Engineering class and the 
remaining classes. 
4.1. Safety Requirements 
A requirement is defined as a condition or 
capability that must be met or possessed by a system 
or system component to satisfy a contract, standard,
specification, or other formally imposed documents. 
[11] Safety requirements are defined as 1) process 
oriented requirements e.g., what needs to be done to 
ensure software safety and 2) technical requirements 
that specify what the system must include or 
implement. [1] The attributes of the safety 
requirements element include the quality of the safety 
requirements and the complexity of the 
implementation that satisfies the safety requirements. 
Safety requirements may be insufficient or missing if 
system hazard analyses did not include the software in 
the analysis or assumed that the software works as 
expected all the time. 
Identifiable 
Identifiable is defined as capable of being 
identified. [12] The identifiable attribute refers to the 
ability to identify in order to track the safety 
requirements based on some unique classification or 
identification scheme. 
Stability 
Stability is defined as having a marked tendency 
to remain unchanged. [12] The stability attribute refers 
to the degree to which the safety requirements are 
changing and the possible effect that changing safety 
requirements and external interfaces will have on the 
quality, safety, functionality, schedule, design, 
integration and testing of the product being built. 
Completeness 
Completeness is defined as having all the 
necessary parts, elements or steps. [12] The 
completeness attribute refers to missing or 
incompletely specified safety requirements. 
Requirements documents that do not include the safety 
requirements, or do not adequately specify the safety 
requirements, or have safety requirements that are "to 
be defined", or have been inadvertently omitted, will 
result in lack of budget for safety requirements. 
Clarity 
Clarity is defined as the quality or state of being 
clear [12] e.g., absence of ambiguity. The clarity 
attribute refers to ambiguously or imprecisely written 
safety requirements. If the customer and provider do 
not have a mutual understanding of the safety 
requirements, then there may be safety requirements 
rework later in the development cycle when it is more 
costly to fix.
Validity 
Validity is defined as being well-grounded or 
justifiable; logically correct. [12] The validity attribute 
refers to whether or not the safety requirements in total 
reflect the customer's expectation for the safety of the 
delivered system. This attribute may be affected by 
ambiguity in safety requirements, unwritten customer 
expectations or constraints, or a specification where 
not all the stakeholders had a chance to make inputs to 
the safety requirements. 
Feasibility 
Feasibility is defined as the degree to which the 
requirements, design or plans for a system or 
component can be implemented under existing 
constraints. [11] The feasibility attribute refers to the 
difficulty of implementing a single technical safety 
requirement or of meeting two or more safety 
requirements that may conflict when implemented 
together in the system. Additionally, feasibility means 
the ability to decide on a tolerable qualification 
method for demonstrating that the system satisfies the 
safety requirements. 
Safety Requirements Traceability 
Traceability is defined as the ability to trace the 
history, application or location of an entity by means 
of recorded identifications. [1] Safety requirements 
traceability is defined as the ability to show the source 
of a particular safety requirement and the linkage from 
that source, in this case the hazard report, to the safety 
requirement and back to the source. The source of the 
safety requirements should be known and available to 
start the traceability for the rest of the safety design 
and development of the system. This includes both 
technical and process-oriented safety requirements. 
The software development/management plans should 
be reviewed for inclusion of the process-oriented 
software safety requirements. 
Safety Requirements Analysis 
Requirements analysis is defined as the process of 
studying and refining system, hardware or software 
requirements. [11] Safety requirements analysis is 
defined as the process of studying and refining the 
safety requirements that result from system hazard 
analyses. This attribute refers to the activities that 
occur early in the life of the system. The concept of 
'what the system shall do' is used to perform system 
level preliminary hazard analysis. Hazards and the risk 
associated with those hazards are identified. Fault tree
analysis is performed using the identified hazards, 
which will include the contribution of the software in 
the system. Safety requirements are derived and 
assigned to hardware and software parts of the system. 
4.2. Safety Design 
Design is defined as the process of defining the 
architecture, components, interfaces, and other 
characteristics of a system or component, as well as 
the result of this process. [11] Safety design is defined 
as the features and methods e.g., inhibits failure 
detection and recovery, interlocks, assertions and 
partitions that are incorporated in the software design. 
[I] The attributes of the safety design element include 
algorithms that are designed for minimum risk or 
include 'fail operational/fail safe' or 'single fault 
tolerant' or 'two fault tolerant' requirements; safety 
functional and performance requirements, internal and 
external safety interfaces. The following attributes 
characterize the safety design element. 
Safety Functionality 
Functionality is defined as the particular set of 
functions or capabilities associated with computer 
software or hardware or an electronic device. [12] 
Safety functionality is defined as the functions 
provided by the safety-critical software. The safety 
functionality attribute covers the safety functional 
requirements that may not be designed sufficiently to 
meet minimum risk, fault tolerance or fail 
operational/fail safe requirements. This includes the 
algorithms or designs that may not meet the overall 
system safety requirements. 
Difficulty 
Difficulty is defined as the quality or state of 
being hard to do, make or carry out. [12] The 
difficulty attribute here refers to safety functional or 
design requirements that may be difficult to achieve. 
The system architecture as designed may be difficult 
to implement to meet the design for minimum risk 
requirements. 
Safety Interfaces 
Interfaces are defined as hardware or software 
components that connect two or more other 
components for the purpose of passing information 
from one to the other. [11] Safety interfaces are 
defined as the hardware or software components 
specifically designed as interfaces to safety-critical 
software, or that implement safety requirements. The
safety interface attribute covers- all hardware and 
safety critical software interfaces and the techniques 
for defining and managing the interfaces. This 
includes commercial off the shelf (COTS), 
government off the shelf (GOTS), modified off the 
shelf (MOTS) and legacy-heritage-reused software 
and developmental hardware interfaces. 
Safety Performance 
Performance is defined as the degree to which a 
system or component accomplishes its designated 
functions within given constraints, such as speed, 
accuracy, or memory usage. [11] Safety performance 
is defined as the ability of a safety-critical system to 
handle periodic capacity, load and timing 
requirements; this is a fundamental safety property. 
[10] The safety performance attribute refers to time 
critical performance; real time response requirements, 
performance analyses, reliability analyses, user 
response requirements, 'must work' and 'must not 
work' requirements, failure detection, isolation and 
recovery requirements. 
Safety Testability 
Testability is defined as the degree to which a 
system or component facilitates the establishment of 
test criteria and the performance of tests to determine 
whether those criteria have been met. [11] Safety 
testability is defined as the ability of a safety design to 
be tested to meet safety criteria. It refers to the design 
of the safety features to facilitate testing and the 
inclusion of safety personnel in the design process to 
facilitate the development and performance of safety 
tests. 
Hardware Constraints 
Hardware constraint is defined as the requirement 
for, or restriction or limitation to using specific 
hardware in a system. In a safety context, it refers to 
the system and processor architecture required to meet 
the system and software safety requirements. The 
constraints may include memory size, throughput, 
real-time response capability, database access or 
capacity limitations, computer hardware type such as 
firmware, Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), 
Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), or personal 
computer usage versus 'big iron' mainframe usage. 
Non-Developmental Software 
Non-developmental software is defined as 
software that is 1) developed in-house such as
government-off-the-shelf, 2) not developed in-house 
such as off-the-shelf, 3) software developed for a 
different project other than the current project it is 
being used for, such as reused software. [10] The Non-
Developmental Software - NDS (COTS, GOTS, and 
MOTS, legacy-heritage-reused) attribute refers to the 
risks with system requirements that may not quite 
meet the system and software safety requirements. The 
customer may not accept vendor development, test, or 
reliability data that would demonstrate satisfaction of 
system and software safety requirements for the NDS. 
It may be difficult to show the 'pedigree' of the NDS 
when safety certification of the system is required. 
Safety Design Traceability 
Safety design traceability is defined as the ability 
to show the source of a safety design feature and the 
linkage from that source, in this case, the safety 
requirements, and back to the source. Since the source 
of the safety design is the safety requirements, this 
constitutes a continuation of the traceability that was 
started in the requirements phase. The process 
documents, such as software design documents, are 
reviewed for the inclusion of process-oriented 
software safety requirements. 
Safety Design Analysis 
Design analysis is defined as the process of 
studying and refining system, hardware or software 
designs. Safety design analysis is defined as the 
process of studying and refining the safety design 
features and methods. It refers to the activities that 
occur during the software design phase such as 
criticality analysis, risk assessments, and 
independence analysis. The software design is 
analyzed for areas or conditions that may lead to 
further hazards being created. The fault tree that was 
started in the requirements phase is updated as a result 
of the software design activities. 
4.3. Safety Code and Unit Test 
Code is defined as computer instructions and data 
definitions expressed in a form suitable for input into a 
compiler or translator. [11] Safety code and unit test is 
defined as the safety-critical software in a system and 
the test process that is performed on the individual 
safety-critical code units. It refers the safety-critical 
software implementation e.g., safety-critical code, 
safety interface specifications and constraints.
Feasibility 
Feasibility is defined as the degree to which the 
requirements, design, or plans for a system or 
component can be implemented under existing 
constraints. [11] The feasibility attribute for safety of 
the code and unit test element refers to problems that 
may be created as a result of poor safety design. 
Safety Testing 
Unit test is defined as testing of individual 
hardware or software units or groups of related units. 
[11] Safety testing is defined as test activities for 
safety-critical units to verify functional software safety 
requirements. [l]lt refers to the planning for unit test 
for safety-critical functions and the resources and time 
for the test activities. Planned test cases especially 
designed for safety-critical units, code units that have 
been peer reviewed, safety simulations and hardware 
necessary to accomplish the test plan are required. 
Coding/Implementation 
The coding/implementation attribute with regards 
to safety covers language constraints, coding 
standards, development and target hardware 
constraints specific to safety-critical systems. 
Safety Code Traceability 
Safety code traceability is defined as the ability to 
show the source of a safety feature in the code and the 
linkage from that source, in this case the safety design, 
and back to the source. Since the source of the safety 
feature in the code is the safety design, this constitutes 
a continuation of the traceability that was started in the 
requirements phase and continued in the design phase. 
The process documents, such as coding standards, are 
reviewed for the inclusion of process-oriented 
software safety requirements. 
Safety Code Analysis 
Code analysis or inspection is defined as a static 
analysis technique that relies on visual examination of 
development products to detect errors, violations of 
development standards, and other problems. [11] 
Safety code analysis is defined as the process of 
reviewing safety-critical code for errors or defects. It 
refers to the activities that occur during the software 
coding/implementation phase. Computer software 
units designated as safety-critical are reviewed for 
correct and complete safety requirements 
implementation. The code is also reviewed for
contributions to hazards. The fault tree that was 
updated in the design phase is further refined as a 
result of the software coding/implementation 
activities. 
4.4. Safety Integration and Test 
Integration is defined as the process of combining 
software components, hardware components, or both 
into an overall system. [11] Test is defined as an 
activity in which a system or component is executed 
under specified conditions, the results are observed or 
recorded, and an evaluation is made of some aspect of 
the system or component. [11] Safety integration and 
test is defined as the integration of the safety-critical 
software and hardware and the test process that is 
performed on the integrated system. It refers to the 
integration and test planning, execution and facilities 
required for the safety-critical development products 
and the safety-critical system. 
Safety Environment 
A test bed is defined as an environment 
containing the hardware, instrumentation, simulators, 
software tools, and other support elements needed to 
conduct a test. [11] The safety environment is defined 
as the integration and test environment that is 
equipped to represent the safety capabilities of the 
operational environment. 
Product Integration 
The product integration attribute with regards to 
safety refers to the integration of the safety-critical 
software components and the hardware, and 
subsequent testing of the integrated system. Safety 
interfaces, testability of safety requirements, adequacy 
of test plans for safety, regression testing for changes, 
and ample time and resources for integration and test 
are factors to consider. 
Safety Test Traceability 
Safety test traceability is defined as the ability to 
show the source of a safety testing requirement and the 
linkage from that source, in this case, the safety 
critical code, and back to the source. Since the source 
of the safety testing is the safety-critical code, this 
constitutes a continuation of the traceability that was 
started in the requirements phase and continued in the 
coding/implementation phase. The process documents, 
such as test plans and procedures, are reviewed for the 
inclusion of process-oriented software safety 
requirements.
Safety Test Analysis 
Test analysis is defined as analyses performed 
before the fact to ensure validity of the tests, and 
analyses of the test results. [10] Safety test analysis is 
defined as reviewing the methods and results of testing 
and documenting and reporting any improperly 
implemented safety features. [1] It refers to the 
activities that occur during the software 
integration/test phase. Problem reports, safety 
verification matrices and test reports are reviewed. 
The fault tree that was updated in the 
code/implementation phase is further refined as a 
result of the integration and testing activities. 
4.5. Engineering Specialties 
The engineering specialties are defined as other 
quality attributes that complement the safety attributes. 
Safety Maintainability 
Maintainability is defined as the ease with which 
a software system or component can be modified to 
correct faults, improve performance or other attributes, 
or adapt to a changed environment. [11] Safety 
maintainability is defined as how well the safety-
critical system was planned and executed to meet the 
technical and process-oriented safety requirements and 
how difficult it is to make changes. Safety 
maintainability may be weakened by not following 
safety standards or safety processes. 
Reliability 
Reliability is defined as the ability of a system or 
component to perform its required functions under 
stated conditions for a specified period of time. [11] 
NASA defines software reliability as the discipline of 
software assurance that (1) defines the requirements 
for software controlled system fault/failure detection, 
isolation, and recovery; (2) reviews the software 
development processes and products for software error 
prevention and/or reduced functionality states; and (3) 
defines the process for measuring and analyzing 
defects and defines/derives the reliability and 
maintainability factors. [1] The reliability attribute as 
it relates to a safety critical system involves the degree 
of control, complexity and timing criticality of the 
software part of the system. These characteristics have 
a strong influence on the development of safe and 
reliable software. [10]
Security 
Security is defined as a discipline focusing on 
preventing unauthorized access to classified 
information and preventing malicious activities. [13] 
The security attribute as it relates to a safety-critical 
system is the ability for unauthorized access into 
software part of the system. 
Human Factors 
Human factors, is defined as an applied science 
concerned with designing and arranging things people 
use so that the people and things interact most 
efficiently and safely. [12] The human factors attribute 
as it relates to a safety-critical system involves 
analyzing the potential human errors in the system, 
tasks that should be done by the system and those 
performed by humans, and the policies and 
management that should be in place to develop the 
system safely. 
Specifications 
A specification is defined as a document that 
specifies, in a complete, precise, verifiable manner, the 
requirements, design, behavior, or other characteristics 
of a system or component, and, often, the procedures 
for determining whether these provisions have been 
satisfied. [11] This attribute addresses the safety 
specifications for the system. These specifications may 
be formal specifications, functional or at the program 
level. Safety specifications will convey the technical 
safety requirements, commonly referred to as 
computer based control system requirements and 
should be well documented and controlled. 
4.6. Legacy 
Legacy as it relates to legacy systems is defined 
as an old computer system or application program that 
continues to be used because the user (typically and 
organization) does not to replace or redesign it. [14] 
The attributes of the legacy element address the 
activities required to determine the safety 
requirements that were implemented and safety 
processes employed in the legacy system. 
Reverse Engineering 
Reverse engineering is defined as to disassemble 
and examine or analyze in detail (as a product or 
device) to discover the concepts involved in 
manufacture usually in order to produce something 
similar. [12] The reverse engineering attribute refers to
the various methods and tools used to produce 
documentation required by safety standards and safety 
requirements. This attribute addresses the difficulty of 
implementing safety standards after the fact if these 
standards are imposed on legacy safety-critical 
systems. 
Replacement 
Replacement is defined as one that replaces 
another especially in a job or function. [12] The 
replacement attribute refers to the activity of replacing 
all or part of a legacy safety-critical system. 
Replacement can result in risks of finding equivalent 
safety-critical systems. 
5. Software Safety Risk Taxonomy Based 
Questionnaire (TBQ) 
Figure 5 below outlines some sample questions 
from the Software Safety Risk Taxonomy Based 
Questionnaire. These are representative of the 
questions used to formulate software safety risks in the 
Product Engineering class, safety requirements 
element, and safety requirements analysis attribute. 
A. Product Engineering 
1. Safety Requirements 
!. Safety requirements analysis 
(Are amtyrequirefloeno analyzed using a epelonasimethodetofty?) 
(I I Was  Preliminary Hazard Analysis (P144) performed for the system? 
(Yes) Is the P144 available for rest em? 
(hen) Is Software Included ass part of the PHA? 
121 Was a System Safety Analysis (SSA) performed for this system? 
(Yen) Is the SSA unstable for review? 
(Yes) Is software Included as  part of the SSA? 
1 3 1 Wa the system and software safety reqsiremants analysed for properfists 
dov.e frOs, the system tenet requirements? 
(No) Who is responsible for Wing the safety analyses? 
1 4 1 What types of safety analyses are performed? 
a. Requirements Criticality Analysis 
S. Software Fault Ire. Analysis 
c. Software Safety Requirements fl—down Analysis 
d. 1n4r9. ThrSfJghfslt and Sling Analysis 
a. Peer Reviews and Inspections of safety requirements 
f. Traceability Analysis 
ft. Control Flow Analysis 
ft. Irdonnatbe flow Analysis 
151 Are safety analyses doojm.ntad? 
(Yen) Am One documented analyses merits unde r configuration control? 
Figure 5. Sample taxonomy based 
questions 
6. The Legacy Systems Risk Database Tool 
In addition to the development of the Software 
Safety Risk Taxonomy, this research project includes 
the design and construction of a database tool. The 
Legacy Systems Risk Database Tool is used to 1) load 
safety standard requirements into the database, 2) 
automate the collection of data, which includes both
the software development and software safety risks, 2) 
provide a reporting capability, including software 
safety risk metrics reports, 3) provide a decision 
making mechanism for project management, and 4) 
create and show traceability links from the risks to the 
selected safety standard requirements. 
Figure 6 below shows a subset of the data model 
for the database tool. The diagram portrays the 
relationships between the Software Safety Risk 
Taxonomy, the TBQ, the software safety 
requirements, the answers to the questions, and the 
software safety risks, for each project. 
Figure 6. Legacy systems risk database 
architecture 
Figure 7 shows a screenshot of the prototype TBQ 
data entry user interface. There will be several more 
user interfaces developed once all of the safety related 
questions are developed based on the new safety 
taxonomy. 
Taxonomy Based Questionnaire 
rtmw n,t.
-o -
n.m 
-- -- --
______
In ii' Ins..	 onnwwx..	 noun,.	 nwno.*. 
Dv.. o 
l41au,..xoun.mu,00vn.,00uan.n na 
no,u[T
 
In..11tnlinrx.un.xxn sun.,. In..ltnn.u.n..xonsrnom I 
D	 r amorroC 
p4 
0	 0 0	 0 II.,) Inyrro.x,.n,snson.u.,..so..o.n,, _______ lrOnwn	 ommn,.mwe,	 -- - 
0v	 Dxs[ J
Figure 7. Legacy systems risk database 
prototype user interface 
7. Summary 
This paper describes the Product Engineering 
Class for the Software Safety Risk Taxonomy that will 
enable a retrospective safety case to be made for 
legacy safety-critical computer systems being 
considered for reuse. In another follow-on paper we 
will describe the Development Environment and 
Program Constraints classes to complete the Software 
Safety Risk Taxonomy. Subsequently, the Software 
Safety Risk Taxonomy Based Questionnaire (TBQ) 
will be constructed that contains the safety related 
questions to elicit software safety risks. The Legacy 
Systems Risk Database Tool that is currently in 
development will serve as a tracking, control and 
communication mechanism for the software safety 
risks that are uncovered by the Software Safety Risk 
TBQ. 
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